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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980's, a lieutenant colonel of the Israeli Air Force embezzled
$11 million of United States military aid and funneled it into Swiss
bank accounts. 1 Using aliases and smuggled records, a United States
* Bainbridge Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. The author most
gratefully expresses her appreciation to Dean Ken Randall and the University of Alabama Law
School Foundation for their support, to David Hoffman for his comments, and to Julie J. Bucy
who conducted the research on the Federal Claims Act Bar for this Article.
1. United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th
Cir. 1995).
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citizen living and working in Israel gathered information about the
embezzlement and reported it to the United States Department of Justice
("DOJ")2 under the civil False Claims Act ("FCA")3 as a co-plaintiff
with the DOJ.4 As a result of their partnership, the United States
Treasury collected $75 million from the guilty parties and the
whistleblower collected $11.3 million.5
This Article uses game theory6  to analyze the public-private
partnership created by the civil FCA. Because of the FCA's enormous
success in detecting and deterring white collar crimes, and its prospect
for detecting and deterring even more,7 understanding this partnership is
important. Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the civil
FCA, focusing on the unusual public-private dynamic created by the
Act. Part III highlights basic principles of game theory, identifying two
game theory concepts especially pertinent to FCA practice: "iterated,"
or repeated, games and game-playing within "close-knit" groups. Part
IV applies these game theory concepts to the partnership created by the
civil FCA and concludes by offering suggestions for optimal strategies
to be pursued by the players in the FCA game.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Angry at contractors who were supplying the Union Army with
defective supplies, President Lincoln lobbied hard for the FCA,8 which
is aimed at government contractors who cheat the federal government. 9
2. Id.
3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
4. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d at 1037-38.
5. Id. at 1036.
6. See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False
Claims Act, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603 (2004) [hereinafter Bucy, Games and Stories] (providing
an in-depth examination of game theory principles).
7. Currently, the FCA applies only in the government contracting context, but its model could
be expanded effectively to other areas, such as protection of financial and securities markets and
protection of the environment. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 58, 76-77
(2002) (hereinafter Bucy, Private Justice].
8. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. For a history of the False Claims Act, see J. Randy Beck, The
False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REv. 539, 565-
607 (2000); Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L.
REV. 905, 909-19 (2002) [hereinafter Bucy, Information as a Commodity]. See also David
Friedman, Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 103, 103-08 (1996), for a
discussion of the English shift from private prosecution to public prosecution, and Note, The
History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83-91 [hereinafter Qui Tam
History], which offers an overview of the linguistic origin, legal structure, and historical
development of English qui tam actions.
9. 132 CONG. REC. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman). According to
an 1863 investigation, 1000 mules delivered to the Union Army were "unfit for the services, and
1022 [Vol. 35
Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act
The FCA creates a civil cause of action against any person who files a
"false claim" against the government, such as falsely alleging the
amount or quality of the products supplied. 10 The FCA provides that a
private party, known as a "relator," may serve as a plaintiff, along with
the United States, in a lawsuit brought under the FCA against the
contractors. I I This private party need not be injured personally or even
affected by the defendant's false claim. Rather, she is deemed to have
standing on an assignment theory-that the federal government, as the
injured party, may assign to the relator its right to sue. 12 These private
actions are called qui tam suits, deriving their name from the Latin
phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur," which means he "who pursues this action on our Lord the
King's behalf as well as his own."
13
The procedure for pursuing qui tam actions is unusual. 14  An
individual who believes she can prove that a defendant has submitted
false claims to the federal government files a qui tam action in federal
court.1 5  The complaint is sealed and not served on the defendant or
made public in any way. 16 The complaint is, however, served on the
United States DOJ, and the action is stayed while the DOJ decides
whether to join the suit as a co-plaintiff. 17  If the DOJ intervenes, it
assumes "primary responsibility" 18 for the lawsuit, though the relator
almost worthless, for being too old or too young, blind, weak-eyed, damaged, worn out or
diseased." Id. See generally False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 3334 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 1 (1986).
10. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
11. Id. § 3730(b).
12. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000)
("[A]dequate basis for the relator's suit.., is to be found in the doctrine that the assignee of a
claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor. The FCA can reasonably
be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim.").
13. Id. at 768 n.l; see also Qui Tam History, supra note 8, at 83 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (1768)).
14. See Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 7, at 49-52 (noting the uniqueness of the qui tam
action and explaining qui tam action procedures).
15. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). The FCA provides that "any person" may bring a civil action under
the FCA. Typical private plaintiffs, known as relators, include current or former employees,
competitors, competitors' employees, state and local governments, special interest groups (such
as Taxpayers Against Fraud), attorneys, and law firms that discover fraud in the course of
representing clients in other matters. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QuI TAM
ACTIONS § 4.01 [B] (2d ed. 2002).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
17. Seeid.
18. Id. § 3730(c)(1). This dual-plaintiff system creates interesting dynamics. When the
government intervenes, qui tam actions become three-party lawsuits. The co-plaintiffs (the
federal government and the relator) are united on some aspects of the litigation (gathering
102320041
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retains certain rights, including the right to object and be heard on
motions to dismiss or settle. 19 If the federal government elects not to
intervene, the relator may proceed with the action as the sole plaintiff.20
When the government intervenes, the relator is guaranteed at least
15% of any judgment or settlement, and the court can award more-up
to 25%.21 If the government does not join the lawsuit, the relator is
guaranteed 25% and could receive up to 30%.22 Only in cases in which
evidence is based on publicly disclosed information or the relator is
partially at fault for the violations does the relator get less.23 Because
the FCA's damages and penalty provisions tend to generate
exceptionally large judgments, 24  relators' percentages involve
substantial sums.2
5
information of fraud and opposing most defense strategies and motions), but the government and
relator become pitted against each other when, for example, the government seeks to have the
relator jurisdictionally barred. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, 72 F.3d 740, 745
(9th Cir. 1995). Such disagreement also might occur if the government disagrees with the award
the relator seeks upon conclusion of the case. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Merena v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1998); United States v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580, 583-84 (S.D. Ohio 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1995).
For a more in-depth discussion of the tension between the DOJ and relators in qui tam cases,
see Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the
Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 23, 36-37, 47-53
(1998).
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2). Some relators have successfully objected to proposed settlements
between the government and qui tam defendants. See, e.g., Gravitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 680 F.
Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
20. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). The federal government may request to receive copies of all
pleadings filed and deposition transcripts (at the government's expense). Id. Upon a showing of
"good cause," the court may permit the government to intervene "at a later date." Id.
21. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
22. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
23. Id. § 3730(d)(1), (3).
24. For example, recent judgments in FCA qui tam cases include a $745 million settlement
with HCA Healthcare Corporation to resolve some of the FCA violations pending against HCA, a
$385 million settlement with National Medical Care, Inc., a $325 million settlement with
SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, a $324 million settlement with National Medical
Enterprises, and a $110 million settlement with National Health Laboratories. BOESE, supra note
15, § 1.05[A].
25. See Response from U.S. Dep't of Justice to FOIA Request 145-FOI-6072 (Oct. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter FOIA Response] (on file with author) (listing the following decisions: United States
ex rel. Durand N. v. Tap Holdings, Inc. (awarding $95.1 million), United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Shell Oil Co. (awarding $64.3 million), United States ex rel. McLendon v. ColumbiaHCA
Healthcare Corp. (awarding $44.1 million), United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care v. Nat'l Med. Care,
Inc. (awarding $40 million)). Historically, relators who proceed on their own after the DOJ has
declined to intervene have enjoyed little success. See FOIA Response, supra. Their cases are
dismissed more often and their recoveries are substantially less. Id. For example, the aggregate
amount paid to relators through fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, as the relators' statutory
share when the government intervened, was $917.6 million. PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP, ALL
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In 1986, Congress substantially amended the FCA, invigorating qui
tam actions.26 The amendments did so in two major ways.27 First, the
qui tam relator is allowed to remain actively involved in the case even if
the federal government joins as a plaintiff.28  Previously, if the
government decided to enter the lawsuit, the qui tam relator retained
only a minor role with no power to influence the course of the lawsuit.
29
The second substantial change made by the 1986 amendments increased
the amount of recovery allowed the qui tam relator and guaranteed a
minimum percentage. 30  The 1986 amendments made a remarkable
ABOUT Qui TAM, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, at http://www.all-about-qui-tam.org./fcastats.shtml
(last visited May 19, 2004) (citing DOJ statistics as of September 30, 2002); TAF EDUC. FUND,
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT LEGAL CENTER, at http://www.taf.org/statistics2002.html (last visited
May 19, 2004) (reporting DOJ statistics for fiscal year ending September 30, 2002). The
aggregate amount to relators during this same time period when the government did not intervene
was $70.2 million. PHILLIPS & COHEN, supra. Also, only 2.1% (12 out of 570) of qui tam FCA
cases in which the government has intervened have been dismissed, whereas 71.1% (1357 out of
1907) of qui tam FCA cases in which the government has not intervened have been dismissed.
Id.
26. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[H]; see False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3133).
27. Other provisions in the 1986 amendments increased the amount of recovery a relator could
obtain, and established a (fairly generous) mandatory minimum recovery for relators. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730; see supra text accompanying notes 21-22 (noting that (as a result of the 1986
amendments) a relator is guaranteed 15 to 25% of the judgment when the government intervenes
and 25 to 30% when it does not). The relator's amount may be reduced to 10% if the FCA case is
based upon information in addition to that provided by the relator. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). This
amount may be reduced to nothing if the relator is convicted of conduct arising from his or her
role in the FCA violation. Id. § 3730(d)(3). The amendments relaxed provisions that had
prevented many relators from filing suit. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 7, at 47 (discussing
the relaxation of the mens rea requirement). The amendments also provided a cause of action for
relators who suffer retribution from their employers for whistleblower activities related to the
FCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Other amendments made FCA cases easier to prove overall, thereby
improving all plaintiffs' chances of success. These amendments included relaxing the mens rea
requirement, id. § 3729(b), establishing that the burden of proof is by a preponderance of
evidence rather than the clear and convincing standard in FCA cases, id. § 3731(c), and
expanding the statute of limitations, id. § 373 1(b).
28. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (stating that the relator continues as a party even if government
joins as a plaintiff); see also id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (stating the relator is entitled to a hearing before
the case is dismissed); id. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (stating that the relator is entitled to a hearing before
the case is settled).
29. The significance of this change is demonstrated dramatically in a 1989 Ohio case in which
the government, which chose to join in a fraud suit initiated by a qui tam relator against General
Electric, was not allowed to settle the case because the qui tam relator objected to the settlement
amount of $234,000. Gravitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1162, 1162-65 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
"Later, on the eve of trial, the case was settled, with the qui tam relator's consent, for $3.5
million." PAMELA H. Bucy, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, CASES AND MATERIALS 715 (2d ed. 1998).
"The qui tam relator received $770,000-22% of the government's recovery." Id.
30. Prior to the 1986 amendments, if the government joined the action, the qui tam relator
could receive no more than 10% of the recovery, and the qui tam relator's share depended on
what the court thought was an appropriate amount. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1982). The 1986
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difference in the use of the FCA. Before 1986, the DOJ received about
six qui tam cases per year.31 Since the 1986 amendments went into
effect, and through fiscal year 2000, 3326 qui tam FCA lawsuits have
been filed and $4.024 billion has been recovered through the FCA.3 2
Eyeing the success of the 1986-invigorated FCA, states are passing
similar statutes covering false claims submitted to state governments. 33
The FCA has proven highly effective for three reasons: (1) it
provides a way for regulators to gain access to high-level, detailed,
inside information about wrongdoing; 34 (2) it provides a mechanism for
private parties and their counsel to supplement regulators' resources; 35
and (3) it has significant potential to control the quality of private party
participation in regulatory efforts. 36 However, the FCA is no panacea.
Because qui tam actions empower private parties-regardless of their
ability or ethics-to bring significant lawsuits against businesses in the
name of the United States, they are subject to abuse. 37
amendments guarantee that even if the government joins the lawsuit, the qui tam relator gets at
least 15% of any judgment or settlement, and the court can award more-up to 25%. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d)(1) (2000). If the government does not join the lawsuit, the qui tam relator is
guaranteed 25%. Id. § 3730(d)(2). Only in cases in which the evidence is based on publicly
disclosed information does the qui tam relator get 10% or less. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
31. Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 46, 48; cf.
WILLIAM L. STRINGER, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AMENDMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC
IMPACT 23 (1996) (consisting of an economic study commissioned by the Taxpayers Against
Fraud and stating that "[iun the period between 1943 and 1986, the Department of Justice records
show only three qui tam cases (with a total recovery of $54 thousand) and, although there could
have been more if records had been able to identify qui tam cases, there were undoubtedly very
few.").
32. FOIA Response, supra note 25.
33. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12650-12656 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (establishing
California's version of the False Claims Act); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1201-1209 (Supp. 2002)
(creating liability for false claims to the state and establishing reporting guidelines); FLA STAT.
ANN. §§ 68.081-.092 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004) (providing remedies for obtaining treble
damages and civil penalties when money is obtained from state government under a false claim);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661-21 (Michie 2002) (outlining requirements for qui tam actions or
recovery of false claims to the state); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/1-175/8 (2002) (creating false
claim liability in Illinois); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 357.010-250 (Michie 2000) (allowing for
recovery for submission of false claims to state or local government); cf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 437.1-440.3 (West 1999) (applying to false claims regarding health care only); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 71-5-181 to -5-185 (2002) (applying to false claims regarding health care under
Medicaid programs only).
34. See Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 7, at 53; Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra
note 8, at 940-47.
35. See Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 7, at 54-56, 61-62.
36. Id. at 68-76.
37. Id. at 62-68 (discussing how frivolous False Claims Act cases create difficulties for
business, regulators, and the judicial system).
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III. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF GAME THEORY
Game theory looks at how people make decisions. Like all economic
modeling, game theory simplifies social situations and offers insights
from the simplification. 38 It was developed in the early and mid-
twentieth century by a mathematician, John von Neumann, and an
economist, Oskar Morgenstern. 39 Game theory arises from the notion
that routinized, describable habits and behaviors govern day-to-day
interactions much as rules govern parlor games such as bridge and
poker.40 Like other rational choice theories, game theory assumes that
decision-makers are rational actors who pursue their self-interest. 4
1
Game theory further assumes that when making decisions, actors take
into account what they expect other rational self-interested decision-
makers to do.42 This assumption leads to a key concept in game theory,
the Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium posits that each player will choose a strategy
that is best for that player given the fact that other players are also
choosing the strategy that is best for them.43 The movie A Beautiful
Mind, based upon the life of John Nash, included a bar scene with an
example of the Nash equilibrium.44 Nash and several of his college
friends are at a crowded bar when a group of attractive college coeds
enter. There are the same number of females in the group as there are
males in Nash's group. In the movie, Nash and his friends are taken
with a particularly attractive blond in the female group. As the males
watch the coeds enter, Nash suggests to his friends that they decide
among themselves which coed each will approach, rather than all
competing for the blond. He explains why-that at best only one of
them will be successful wooing the blond, and that their obvious
competition for her will anger the other girls so much that none of them
38. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 7, 15 (1994); MORTON D.
DAVIS, GAME THEORY 6-8 (1983); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 157 (1991).
39. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953).
40. DAVIS, supra note 38, at xv.
41. ELLICKSON, supra note 38, at 156-59; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 19-23 (5th ed. 1998).
42. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 38, at 11-12; ELLICKSON, supra note 38, at 156-64; MARTIN J.
OSBORNE & ARIEL A. RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 1 (1994).
43. John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155-62 (1950); cf. BAIRD
ET AL., supra note 38, at 19-28; DAVIS, supra note 38, at 119-123; AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY
J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 85-86 (1991); HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY
EVOLVING 6 (2000); OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 42, at 155-57.
44. A BEAUTIFUL MIND (Universal Pictures 2001).
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will be amenable to the males' subsequent efforts to charm them. This
is the Nash equilibrium: in selecting their strategy for wooing the coeds,
Nash and his friends take into account what the girls are likely to be
thinking-resentment at being chosen second. Thus, Nash and his
friends revise their initial strategy of competing for the blond to a
strategy of agreeing among themselves which coed each male will
approach. In this sense, the Nash equilibrium advises players in any
game that, when choosing their strategies, they should take into account
what other players are likely to do.
Two game theory principles are particularly relevant to FCA practice.
The first is that the FCA is an iterated game with repeat players. The
DOJ is the obvious repeat player in the FCA game because the DOJ will
deal with many FCA cases, FCA counsel, and FCA defendants over
time. Because of the specialized nature of FCA practice, most private
attorneys (plaintiff and defense) who handle FCA cases also will be
repeat players. Even some of the defendants, especially large defense
contractors, will be repeat players. The second game theory principle
seen in FCA practice is that its players, especially counsel, are part of a
close-knit group.
IV. APPLYING GAME THEORY TO THE CiviL FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. Repeated or Iterated Games
Considerable scholarship has been devoted to the way game
strategies change when games repeat. Robert Axelrod pioneered
scholarship of iterated games with his analysis of computer generated
games45 modeled after the Prisoner's Dilemma. 46 Axelrod solicited
computer games from game theory experts. 47 The only two choices of
play allowed in the two-player games he solicited were cooperation
45. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 109 (1984).
46. The Prisoner's Dilemma is the most well-known game used to demonstrate the
interdependence of decisions. DixIr & NALEBUFF, supra note 43, at 11-13. Two prisoners are
held in separate cells and they are not allowed to communicate with each other. Id. Each is given
the choice of confessing (and implicating the other prisoner) or refusing to confess. Id. If both
prisoners refuse to confess, they both go free. Id. Otherwise, the prisoner who confesses first
gets a short prison sentence and the nonconfessing (or second-to-confess) prisoner gets a lengthy
prison sentence. Id. Thus, even though each individual prisoner has an incentive to defect (to be
the first to confess) and do it quickly, both prisoners are better off if they cooperate and refuse to
confess. Id. While the first to defect benefits himself, he benefits himself more by cooperating
from the beginning with the other prisoner. Id. Thus, mutual cooperation is the best strategy for
both prisoners. Id.
47. AXELROD, supra note 45, at xi-xii.
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with the other player and noncooperation, or defection. 48  Axelrod
played the games against each other in computer generated
tournaments. 49  The winning strategy in every tournament was the
simplest strategy submitted-Tit-for-Tat.50 A player using a Tit-for-Tat
strategy begins play by cooperating with the other player and thereafter
copying whatever strategy the other player used on the prior move. 51
Thus, a player begins by cooperating and continues to cooperate as long
as the other player cooperates. 52 A player is never the first to defect but
responds with defection when presented with defection. 53
Axelrod's observations about optimal strategies in iterated games
have become game theory lore. First, in the short-run, each player has
incentive not to cooperate, but in the long-run, players benefit most by
cooperating. 54  Second, a player should not cooperate with another
player if the other player becomes uncooperative, 55 but a player should
respond to noncooperation with noncooperation, and return to
cooperation only when the other player returns to cooperation. 56 Third,
in zero-sum games (where one player wins only if the other player
loses), hiding one's strategy is beneficial, but in non-zero-sum games
(where both parties have the potential to win), clearly communicating
one's strategy of cooperation is best.57 Fourth, clarity in one's strategy
is essential in pursuing optimal strategies in repeating games; 58 thus
each player's strategy should be "eminently comprehensible to the other
player." 59
To demonstrate how Axelrod's observations apply to FCA practice,
we will focus on the DOJ and the game moves available to the DOJ.
There are, at most, five key decisions the DOJ must make in any FCA
case brought to the DOJ by a relator: (1) whether to investigate the
information the relator brings;60 (2) how thorough of an investigation to
48. Id. at 30.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 31.
51. Id. at 136-37.
52. Id. at 36-39.
53. Id. at 113-20.
54. Id. at 109.
55. Id. at 118-20.
56. Id. at 118-19.
57. Id. at 122-23.
58. See id. at 120.
59. Id. at 122.
60. If the information does not appear to be credible, the DOJ likely will do little or nothing to
further investigate the allegations.
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conduct;61 (3) whether to intervene in the case; (4) whether to oppose
the relator's case, in whole or part, if the DOJ does not intervene;62 and
(5) what to recommend as to the percentage of judgment allocatable to
relator.63
Axelrod's principles for optimal game playing suggests that at each
of these key points, the DOJ should begin by working with each relator
and the relator's counsel cooperatively. 64 A DOJ cooperation strategy
would include facilitating contact between the DOJ and relators'
61. ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QuI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER 41 (2001). If the
information of wrongdoing appears credible, the DOJ likely will investigate the matter further
through subpoenas or interviews. Id. Such investigation may be for criminal or civil liability or
both. If the DOJ investigates the matter, it must decide how much to involve the relator. Those
relators who are insiders-whether to the targeted business or just the industry-can be extremely
helpful in identifying relevant transactions, records, or individuals to speak with. Knowledgeable
insiders can also be helpful in explaining industry practices and trends. According to one
experienced relator's counsel:
The role of relator's counsel will depend in large part on whether the government
lawyers need and want assistance. In some cases, due to shortage of resources or
attorney inexperience, the government may choose not to litigate the case aggressively;
in this event, counsel for the relator may wish to take up the laboring oar.
Id. at 69. There are innumerable examples in which a relator's counsel has conducted
considerable work on an FCA case jointly pursued by the DOJ and the relator. For example, in
one qui tam FCA case, six law firms devoted twenty full-time lawyers to the case and incurred $1
million per month in investigative costs, just to prepare the case for filing. John R. Phillips,
Remarks at the 2001 A.B.A. National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam
Enforcement, Panel on FCA Enforcement in the Post-Stevens World (Nov. 29, 2001).
In another recent qui tam FCA case, in which there were 125 defense attorneys and fifteen
relators' attorneys, plus DOJ attorneys, the federal courthouse was not large enough to
accommodate the group for docket calls. Scott A. Powell, Remarks at the Mealey's Conference,
Litigating Whistleblower Cases Under the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, Panel on
Reports from the Field, Developments on Notable Cases (June 11, 2001) (referring to United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Shell Oil Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Tex. 1999)). The defendant,
Shell Oil Company, produced 7000 banker boxes of records. Id. One of the relator's attorneys
took responsibility for handling all documents in the case. Id. Doing so took 5000 square feet of
warehouse space (with the record boxes stacked seven feet high). Id. This relator's attorney
organized the records so that the plaintiffs could respond within thirty days to any defense request
for identification of any record pertaining to a particular claim by producing a CD containing the
requested records. Id. This case settled on February 4, 2000, with a recovery to the U.S.
Treasury of $400 million and a relators' share of $64 million. FOIA Response, supra note 25.
62. If the DOJ decides not to participate in the matter, either because the case lacks merit or
because the DOJ lacks resources, the DOJ must decide how to respond if the relator opts to
continue the case. Under the FCA statute and evolving practice, the DOJ has the authority to
intervene for limited purposes in a case, such as moving for dismissal of the case. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(c)(2)(A) (2000); see also Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 7, at 70-72.
63. Cf. WEST, supra note 61 at 41-55 (outlining the DOJ's issues); Bucy, Private Justice,
supra note 7, at 51-52 (discussing relator's goals vis-A-vis the DOJ).
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting Axelrod's first principle-that players
benefit in the long run by cooperating with other players).
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counsel 65  and involving relators and relators' counsel in the
investigation to the extent feasible.66  Axelrod's principles further
suggest that the DOJ should cease cooperating with relators and
relators' counsel only when they cease to cooperate with the DOJ.6 7 A
relator's lack of cooperation could range from minor (e.g., not being
available to meet with DOJ personnel when promised), to significant
(e.g., providing inaccurate or incomplete information to the DOJ), to
catastrophic (e.g., alerting suspects and assisting in a cover-up of the
problem). Following the lesson of Tit-for-Tat, the DOJ should respond
to relators' defections in kind, with noncooperation strategies that match
the seriousness of the relators' defections. 68 Given the significance of a
relator's defection (destruction of evidence, for example), the DOJ's
appropriate response may be complete discontinuation of cooperation
with the relator. Only if a relator returns to a trustworthy, cooperative
strategy after a defection should the DOJ return to a cooperation
strategy.69
Not only is the message the DOJ sends to potential relators and
relators' counsel important, but, because the FCA is a non-zero sum
game, so is clarity in sending the message. 70  FCA qui tam actions
present non-zero-sum games, at least as between the DOJ and the
relator, since both the DOJ and the relator can "win" by working
cooperatively to detect, investigate, and pursue fraudulent defendants.
The press can be helpful in communicating the DOJ's Tit-for-Tat
strategy in FCA cases by publicizing the opportunities for and virtues of
65. The FCA has gone a long way in establishing these protocols. It directs the plaintiffs to
file their complaints under seal, thereby giving the government time and opportunity to
investigate the plaintiffs' claims. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). It requires the plaintiffs to serve the
government with a copy of their complaints as well as "written disclosure of substantially all
material evidence and information" the relator possesses, thereby enabling the government to
more efficiently utilize the relator's information. Id. The FCA also requires the government to
respond to a relator's case within a set time period. Id. § 3730(b)(2)-(3). Also, the FCA has
established a mechanism for relators and the government to proceed as dual plaintiffs. See id.
§ 3730(c)(1). Finally, if the government chooses not to join the case, the government has the
power to monitor a relator's litigation of the case. Id. § 3730(c)(2).
Individual DOJ offices have developed additional protocols for communicating with relators
prior to and after a relator's case is filed and throughout the government's investigation, so as to
keep a relator informed of the case's status. WEST, supra note 61, at 47-50, 53-56.
66. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (providing limits on disclosing grand jury evidence).
67. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting Axelrod's second principle-that
players should not cooperate with uncooperative players).
68. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Tit-for-Tat strategy).
69. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing Axelrod's second principle,
which states that players should not cooperate with uncooperative players).
70. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (explaining Axelrod's fourth principle,
which states that clarity in communicating one's strategy to other players is important).
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serving as a relator.71 For this reason, the DOJ's strategy when dealing
with the press in FCA cases should be making information about the
DOJ's practices and strategies accessible through press releases, reports,
knowledgeable government personnel, and conferences that inform and
educate the public about the FCA.
Although the mainstream press effectively can convey the fairly
simple message that serving as a relator can be beneficial and that the
DOJ is ready, willing, and able to work with relators, 72 the press is not
equipped to convey more subtle messages about the DOJ's FCA
practice. The private bar can do so, however. The FCA bar consists of
relators' counsel and defense attorneys. Both groups are likely to be
repeat players.73  Like the press, the private bar can communicate the
general message that the DOJ is ready, willing, and able to work with
relators and their counsel and that, for many, the benefits of working
with the DOJ outweigh a relator's costs.74  The private bar, especially
relators' counsel, can do even more, however. Relators' counsel can
screen FCA cases by discouraging relators from going forward in
nonmeritorious cases. 75 Counsel does so by refusing to take such cases.
71. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 8, at 969.
72. See France, supra note 31, at 46. News stories often report on relators' experiences with
the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, He Blew the Whistle and Health Giants
Quaked, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, § 3, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York
Times File; Ralph Vartabedian, Teledyne's Legal Ills Mounting, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at
Dl, available at 1992 WL 2838306; Whistleblower Gets $13 Million, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1992, at
10, available at 1992 WL 4546091; Whistle-blowers Win Against Lockheed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16,
1990, at 2, available at 1990 WL 2884280.
73. Cf. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 7, at 58-59 (describing the sophistication of FCA
cases and the result that inexperienced counsel does not undertake FCA cases).
74. See Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 8, at 948-58 (discussing the costs of
becoming a whistleblower).
75. See, e.g., Mitchell R. Kreindler, So You Wanna Be a Whistleblower's Lawyer? 2 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Matching cases to your firm's resources is always a critical skill and nowhere is it
more critical than in representing qui tam relators. Unlike other contingent fee
practices, like personal injury, qui tam is unlikely to ever become a high volume
practice. Combine that with the fact that most qui tam cases take three to five years to
resolve and it is clear that picking viable cases is the lifeblood of a successful qui tam
practice.
Id. Perhaps unwittingly referring to what is one of the key features of a repeated game-
protection of one's reputation-Kreindler explains how carefully choosing cases affects a
relator's attorney's reputation:
Not only is it important to your financial health to pick 'good' cases, it is also
important to your reputation with the government. If you can develop a reputation for
bringing meritorious cases, the reception you receive from the government will be far
different than the one you will receive if you throw every qui tam claim you can find
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Relators' counsel generally take FCA cases on a contingency basis and
front all or most investigation expenses. 76 Because of their complexity,
FCA cases are expensive to prepare and lengthy to resolve.77 Aware of
the risks inherent in such cases, experienced relators' attorneys screen
out many non-meritorious cases before they reach the DOJ or the
courts.
7 8
Relator's counsel can also help control difficult or demanding
relators79 while optimizing the information a relator can provide. Many
against the wall in the hope that something will stick. The quality of case selection
may be the most important attribute of a successful qui tam attorney.
Id.
76. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 8, at 971-72. For example, in United
States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994), the
relator's counsel and the relator agreed that counsel would receive 25% of the relator's share.
This percentage was in addition to attorney fees and costs awarded by the court pursuant to 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). Id. The total amount awarded to the relator's counsel in this case exceeded
$4 million. Id.
John R. Phillips, an experienced relators' attorney and generally credited as one of the
architects of the 1986 FCA Amendments, discussed in a Wall Street Journal letter to the editor
the financial risk relators' counsel take on. John R. Phillips, Letter to the Editor, The Taxpayers
Win When the Whistle Blows, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 10, 1995, at A9. Phillips was responding to a
prior article in the Wall Street Journal, the point of which is obvious from Phillip's response:
You suggest that lawyers who bring these [qui tam] lawsuits may be making too much
money. You fail to take into consideration the financial risks lawyers take to sustain
the cases over years of litigation as they do battle with deep-pocket defendants ....
For example, from 1987 to 1994, private attorneys in our cases... spent more than
100,000 hours (more than 60 attorney years)- not to mention the huge out-of-pocket
costs-bringing outlaw corporations to justice. I, personally, went deeply into debt
risking everything I own to finance these cases, coming within weeks of having no idea
of how I was going to meet the next payroll.
Id.
77. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 8, at 940.
78. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
79. Experienced relators counsel describe relators as persons under tremendous stress,
suffering from professional, personal, marital, and family tensions brought on by their whistle
blowing. Kreindler, supra note 75, at 2-3. They are often "paranoid... tired.., lonely ....
beat-up, frustrated and isolated." Id. at 3. They "require more personal attention ... than most
other clients." Id. Relators tend to be "exceedingly bright and inquisitive ... assertive and
tenacious... outraged... suspicious of the government ... suffering from nagging doubts [that
they are] 'crazy."' WEST, supra note 61, at 30-31.
DOJ attorneys rely on a relator's counsel to educate the relator about the risks and difficulties
that likely lie ahead in an FCA qui tam action. As one experienced Assistant United States
Attorney noted:
The relator should be educated to the risks of whistle blowing and investigative
process, particularly in speculative, marginal cases. [For example,] [t]he seal
provisions of the statute provide only temporary anonymity. Accordingly, even after
the government declines to intervene and the relator determines not to proceed there is
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members of the relators' bar are former federal prosecutors with
extensive experience investigating and preparing the type of complex,
sophisticated, and economically motivated wrongdoing the FCA
involves. 80  These attorneys are experienced enough to take the
information a relator has and package it in a way that is helpful to the
DOJ. Such packaging includes piecing together complex transactions,
investigating lengthy paper trails, and controlling, cajoling, and
counseling difficult clients. 81  Such efforts by private counsel can
conserve scarce DOJ resources. 82
As an aside, it is interesting to note that the communicative functions
of the FCA private bar feed an interesting dynamic of competition
among United States Attorney's offices for relators. Because of their
size and complexity, FCA cases often are of national scope and offer
multiple venue options. This means that relators' counsel can steer
relators to certain DOJ offices and away from others. Assistant U.S.
Attorneys vie for meritorious FCA qui tam cases because the greater
FCA recoveries that an office can garner, the more resources and
recognition within the DOJ that office obtains.83 In addition, individual
attorneys within the DOJ advance their careers, inside the DOJ and
beyond, by handling high profile, large-dollar FCA cases. U.S.
Attorney's offices and individual DOJ attorneys vary considerably in
their treatment of relators, their willingness to advise relators about
procedures and a case's viability, the resources they can devote to qui
tam FCA cases, 84 and their expertise and comfort-level in working with
a danger that the public record will reveal the filing of suit that both the relator and the
United States declined to pursue.
Kathleen McDermott, Qui Tam, An AUSA's Perspective, FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QuI TAM Q.
REv., Oct. 1997, at 20, 23.
80. See infra note 127 (providing a chart showing that 48.3% of the private FCA bar has prior
DOJ experience).
81. WEST, supra note 61, at 53-56.
82. See id. at 47.
83. Cf. JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 128 (1987) (explaining that the DOJ
apportioned more resources to offices that posted results garnering favorable media attention).
84. As one experienced relators' attorney explained:
Methods for dealing with qui tam cases vary greatly from one U.S. Attorney's Office
to another. [For example,] [s]ome U.S. Attorney's Offices encourage relators'
attorneys to contact them with their allegations before filing suit when they can
informally exchange information regarding qui tam procedures and discuss the
potential merits of the suit. This informal exchange of information often prevents the
filing of bad qui tam lawsuits and improves the quality of the suits which are filed....
Some U.S. Attorney's offices are also better at obtaining resources-investigators,
primarily-from other agencies. Obviously, your client is better served if you are able
to file her case in a jurisdiction where significant resources can be devoted to the case.
Kreindler, supra note 75, at 7.
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relators and relators' counsel. Jurisdictions vary in applicable precedent
and favorable or knowledgeable jurists. 85 Relators' counsel weigh these
issues in determining where to file their clients' cases.
B. Iterated Games in Close-knit Groups
1. Game Theory Principles Applicable to Close-knit Groups
Robert Ellickson has conducted the leading work in game theory on
how games are affected when the players are members of a close-knit
group. 86 To study this phenomenon, Ellickson conducted field research
in Shasta County, California, on how neighbors interact with each
other.87  Shasta County is in north-central California, bordered by the
Cascade Mountains. 88 The major economic activity in Shasta County is
cattle-raising. 89 Ellickson's study focused on Shasta County neighbors'
interactions over the cattle that roam in Shasta county.90
Most of Shasta County is designated as open range, where cattle
roam free. 91 In open-range areas, cattle owners generally are not legally
85. For example, the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopt statutory interpretations on
key issues in FCA cases that are more favorable to relators, while the First, Second, and Third
Circuits adopt statutory interpretations more favorable to defendants. Compare United States ex
rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1521 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that
information-a report in the files-potentially available to the public does not activate the
jurisdictional bar provisions), with United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d
1149, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that information-discovery in unrelated case-
potentially available to the public activates the jurisdictional bar provision); compare United
States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a
government employee with responsibility for uncovering fraud cannot qualify as a qui tam
relator), with United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1502 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a government employee may qualify as a relator); compare United States ex rel.
Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a relator is barred if the
complaint reflects publicly held information even if relator did not rely upon it or base her
complaint on it), with United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1349
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a relator's complaint is not barred even if it reflects publicly held
information where the relator received his information elsewhere and did not base his complaint
on the publicly held information).
86. See ELLICKSON, supra note 38, at vii-viii (studying how close-knit groups, primarily in
the context of cattle ranchers, farmers, and other rural residents in Shasta County, California,
resolve disputes over trespassing cattle without resorting to the legal system).
87. Id. at vii. Shasta County was a prime area to study neighbor disputes because immediately
prior to Ellickson's study, it had seen tremendous growth, which presented great potential for
conflicts between the older, established residents of the county and newer residents. Id. at 19-25.
88. Much of the county is mountainous or consists of foothills leading to the mountains. Id. at
15. The soil is generally poor: only one percent of the county's land is devoted to agricultural
crops. Id. at 16-17. The area is also arid in the summer, receiving very little rain. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 1-3.
91. Id. at 3.
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liable for damages arising from cattle trespassing on unfenced land.92
Portions of Shasta County, however, have been designated as closed
range.93  In closed-range areas, cattle owners are strictly liable for
damage caused by their wandering cattle.
94
Problems arise when cattle trespass.95 They eat grass and, if they can
get to it, devour stored feed.96  They destroy expensive landscaped
property and vegetable gardens. 97 The most serious problems occur
when the cattle venture onto roadways and cause vehicle accidents.
98
Wandering cattle create problems for their owners as well as
neighbors. 99  They sustain injuries, get stolen, and consume their
owners' time when their owners have to retrieve them. 100 Wandering
bulls, because they are more aggressive than cows, create even more
problems. 10 1 Bulls charge property owners 10 2 and impregnate cows,
resulting in calves of undesired pedigree. 103
The earliest residents of Shasta County established large ranches that
have a significant current market value (most over $1 million), but
generate modest income. 1°4 The families that own these ranches live
simply, in unassuming homes, and work seven-day work weeks raising
cattle as their livelihood. 10 5 Most of the new Shasta County residents,
who own "ranchettes" consisting of parcels of land ranging from five to
forty acres, generally do not raise cattle. 
106
Among the cattle-raisers there are two groups: the traditionalists, who
let their cattle roam freely over ranch lands or on higher-elevation,
unfenced property leased from timber companies, 10 7 and modernists,
who tend to fence in their property and irrigate it so that there is
adequate feed year-round.' 0 8 Although the modernists have less to lose
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 25-26.
96. Id. at 40-41.
97. Id. at 41.
98. Id. at 82-85.
99. Id. at 25-26.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 41.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 26, 41.
104. Id. at 20.
105. Id. at 20-21.
106. Id. at 21.
107. Id. at 22-23.
108. Id. at 24-25.
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if additional portions of Shasta County are designated closed range, they
tend to side with the traditionalists in opposing efforts to close
additional portions of the county.
10 9
Ellickson began his study researching animal-trespass laws
applicable in Shasta County." l0 He also interviewed residents and
Shasta County animal-trespass experts such as insurance claims
adjusters, law enforcement officials, and lawyers. 1 ' Ellickson found
that the residents of Shasta County rarely used available legal remedies
or even followed the law's allocation of liability when resolving
problems caused by trespassing cattle.1 12 Instead, they used informal
norms of civility and neighborliness to resolve problems even when the
norms were to their legal disadvantage. 113  Accordingly, in Shasta
County, trespass incidents are resolved by an exchange of civilities that
follow a set protocol: the victim of the trespass notifies the cattle
owner, 114 the cattle owner apologizes to the victim and thanks the
person for calling, and the cattle owner promptly removes his
animals. 115 Ellickson found that resort to these informal norms rather
than to legal remedies benefited everyone. 116 Time, money, and hard
feelings were saved when neighbors resolved problems without
pursuing available legal remedies.
117
Ellickson sought to determine what led the Shasta County neighbors
to use informal norms. 118 He found the existence of a close-knit group
to be the key. In this context, a "close knit group" exists where there
are interactions among repeat players who share common characteristics
and informal norms and exchange information easily, where each player
possesses power within the group, and where the group employs
sanctions to discipline members who fail to follow the group's informal
norms. 119 In Shasta County, these sanctions include (in escalating
order): (1) self-help retaliation, 120 (2) reporting offenses through
109. Id. at 25.
110. Id. at 42-48.
111. Id. at 40 n.1.
112. Id. at 52-56.
113. Id. at 52-53.
114. Id. at 53. The victim generally notifies the owner by phone not as a complaint, but as a
service, as in "I found one of your animals." Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 10, 52, 283.
117. See id. at 56-64.
118. Id. at 9-10.
119. Cf id. at 48-64 (describing the close-knit group of Shasta County neighbors).
120. Id. at 57. Shasta County residents discipline deviant neighbors in several ways:
spreading truthful negative gossip about noncooperative neighbors; herding trespassing animals
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"truthful negative gossip," 121 (3) requesting compensation for damage
created, 122 and (4) resorting to legal means. 123
2. Application of Close-knit Group Theory to False
Claims Act Practice
The FCA bar meets Ellickson's definition of a close-knit group. Its
members are repeat players who share common characteristics and
informal norms, exchange information easily, possess power within the
group, and employ sanctions to enforce the group's informal norms. 124
a. Repeat Players
Attorneys with the DOJ are obvious repeat players in FCA practice.
All FCA cases in the United States are handled by specialists within the
DOJ's Civil Division who either are assigned to cases directly or
supervise cases based in various U.S. Attorneys' offices. 125 The private
bar, both relators' counsel and defense counsel, are repeat players
primarily because of the complexity, risk, and sophistication of FCA
cases. 126 Even defendants can be repeat players, often as reconstructed
corporate entities.
b. Shared Characteristics
The FCA bar, which includes DOJ attorneys, relator's counsel, and
defense counsel, is a surprisingly close-knit group. The attorneys in this
group share common characteristics in addition to their experience in
to places from which it is inconvenient for their owners to retrieve them; threatening to harm,
even kill, offending animals (e.g., one irate neighbor threatened to castrate a wandering bull);
actually harming animals; and "borrowing" needed equipment belonging to the animal owner. Id.
at 56-59, 80. Cattle rustling apparently was a common response to an especially notorious
rancher, Frank Ellis, who allowed his herds to roam freely, damaging many neighbors' property.
Id. at 56-59. One Shasta County resident who lived in Oak Run, an area especially tormented by
Ellis's trespassing cattle, suggested that Ellis print t-shirts saying "Eat Ellis Beef. Everyone in
Oak Run does!" Id. at 59.
121. Id. at 57; see also id. at 59 (explaining that residents occasionally report a cattle trespass
to county officials, such as animal control officers or brand inspectors).
122. Id. at 57, 60-61. The Shasta County norm is to use "in-kind" compensation, such as
replanting damaged crops, rather than cash payments. Id. at 61.
123. Id. at 57, 62-64.
124. See infra Part IV.B.2.a-e (describing the FCA bar's close-knit group characteristics).
125. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL 4-4.120 (1998); Kreindler, supra
note 75, at 7.
126. Telephone and Internet Research of Faculty at American Bar Association National
Institute on The Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement (1998-2001) [hereinafter
Telephone and Internet Research] (research on file with author). Among FCA specialists, 68.5%
primarily or exclusively represent defendants, 28.8% primarily or exclusively represent relators,
and 1.4% represent both relators and defendants. Id.
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FCA cases. A survey of the FCA private bar shows that 93.5 % share at
least two of the following professional characteristics: (1) 50.7%
attended a "top 25" undergraduate institution, (2) 71.2% attended a "top
25" law school, (3) 48.3% served in the DOJ prior to entering private
practice, (4) 23.3% served as a law clerk to a federal judge, (5) 42.5%
possess a leadership role in their law firm, and (6) 31.5% have authored
three or more publications in the FCA field. 127
c. Informal Norms
In the case of the Shasta County residents, the informal norms that
governed the group were civility and neighborliness in resolving the
problems caused by trespassing cattle. 128 In FCA practice, there are
also informal norms of behavior. For relators' counsel, these include
the expectation that relators' counsel will bring only meritorious cases
to the DOJ's attention, 129 will warn DOJ attorneys if problems develop
in the case, 130 will be trustworthy and accurate in their representations
about the case, 131 and will deliver on What they promise. 132
127. Telephone and Internet Research, supra note 126. See figure 1 below.
Figure 1
Common Characteristics of FCA Specialists
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128. ELLICKSON, supra note 38, at 52-55, 280-83.
129. See WEST, supra note 61, at 31-49; Kreindler, supra note 75, at 2.
130. See WEST, supra note 61, at 42.
131. Kreindler, supra note 75, at 2.
132. Id.
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For DOJ counsel, the expectations are that DOJ attorneys will work
closely with the relator and the defendant and their respective attorneys
early in the case, 133 that DOJ counsel will alert the relator's counsel if
another relator has previously filed a qui tam action covering the same
material, 134 and that DOJ counsel will warn the relator's counsel if there
are problems in the relator's case 135 or if the DOJ is going to take some
action detrimental to the relator. 136  For defense counsel, the
expectations are that if defense counsel is brought into discussions with
the DOJ regarding the defendant's liability, 137 defense counsel will be
honest and thorough in her representations. For example, if the defense
counsel represents that the defendant was unaware of certain applicable
regulations, or was confused as to their interpretation, DOJ counsel will
expect that the defense counsel has investigated the matter fully with the
133. Cf. T. Clay Mason & Larry D. Leonard, A Government Investigator Perspective, FALSE
CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REv., July 1997, at 10, 11-12 (explaining why and how relators'
contact with the DOJ prior to filing qui tam complaints is valuable for all players); McDermott,
supra note 79, at 22-23 (giving advice to relators to contact the DOJ prior to filing a qui tam
complaint). Some U.S. Attorney's offices, for example, encourage relators to approach them as
soon as they have identified a possible violation. McDermott, supra note 79, at 22. These
discussions often are frank and extensive, and include DOJ advice to relators on procedural
matters. Id. For an in-depth discussion of legal theory and case strength, see United States ex rel.
Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2001). Some
U.S. Attorney's offices have adopted a policy of seeking a lifting of the seal on the otherwise
confidential information in an FCA suit to discuss it with the defendant and defense counsel as
part of the DOJ's decisional process of whether and what charges to bring against a defendant.
McDermott, supra note 79, at 25-26. This practice, which is not mandated or even suggested by
the language or legislative history of the FCA, is especially remarkable because it is contrary to
the DOJ's customary ways of conducting its cases and making its decisions in confidence and
without consultation with private parties. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (requiring secrecy of grand
jury proceedings).
134. This is significant information to relators because once an FCA qui tam case has been
filed, all others are preempted. See WEST, supra note 61, at 22; cf. Kreindler, supra note 75, at 7.
Because qui tam cases are filed under seal and remain under seal for years, other prospective
relators will have no way of knowing whether it is worth their time and resources to prepare a qui
tam case for filing. A tip by a DOJ attorney who is aware of pending cases under seal can be
invaluable to prospective relators and their counsel. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2000).
135. McDermott, supra note 79, at 27; Kreindler, supra note 75, at 10.
136. Such detrimental action could include seeking limitations on a relator's involvement, 31
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(4), moving to dismiss the relator's case, id. § 3730(c)(2)(A), or opposing a
settlement the relator may have reached with the defendant, id. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
137. McDermott, supra note 79, at 25-26. The defendant may only be a putative defendant
since some discussions between the DOJ and targets can occur before a relator has filed her qui
tam action. Id. This situation would occur when the relator approached the DOJ prior to filing
her qui tam action. Id.; Mason & Leonard, supra note 133, at 10-13.
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defendants and is informed when providing the DOJ with this
exculpatory explanation. 
38
138. Because of the unusual level of communication between the DOJ and relators' counsel
and, often, also with defense counsel, attorneys who are players in the FCA game must deal with
a special dilemma. Every attorney has the ethical obligation not to represent a client if "the
representation... will be materially limited by... a personal interest of the lawyer." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002). The comments to this rule include the
following: "[C]onflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially
limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests." Id. cmt. 8. Because of the
informal norms existing in FCA practice, attorneys could run afoul of this ethical obligation when
following such norms.
Imagine the following scenario: As noted, a relator's counsel is expected to alert the DOJ to
problems that counsel is aware of in the case. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. This is
a reasonable expectation, since the DOJ will be devoting resources to investigating and preparing
the case. If the problem is that the relator has been involved in the wrongdoing, the relator's
counsel understandably may be reluctant to reveal such involvement to the DOJ. A culpable
relator almost certainly would see her percentage of any recovery in the FCA case cut
considerably, plus she may be indicted on criminal charges. Yet if counsel does not reveal the
relator's culpability, counsel's credibility as a repeat player in future FCA encounters with the
DOJ will be compromised.
A similarly difficult situation arises for defense counsel who has been given an opportunity by
the DOJ to review the potential case against a defendant and explain the defendant's position to
the DOJ. Assume that here, too, significant harm could befall the defendant if the DOJ learns
from defense counsel the full scope of the defendant's wrongdoing. Yet again, if defense counsel
is not forthcoming with the DOJ when given the opportunity to engage in candid discussions,
defense counsel's credibility as a future player in other cases with the DOJ will suffer. Again,
while lack of candor is a problem for counsel in any encounter with the DOJ or any other
government representative, the norm of truthful prefiling discussion and candor that prevails in
FCA practice raises the stakes of a less-than-truthful policy.
In stark terms, both the relator and defense counsel face the possibility of damaging their own
interests if they follow their clients' instructions not to reveal their clients' liability. They will be
damaged because, as repeat players in the FCA regulatory games their reputations will suffer
from the deceit they practice at their clients' instructions. Unlike their clients, neither counsel has
anything to lose by revealing their clients' liability; they stand to lose only by not revealing such
liability. The consequences for private counsel if the DOJ learns of its deceit would likely begin
with the DOJ attorneys' reluctance to grant counsel access and opportunities to discuss future
matters with the DOJ. This reluctance will damage counsel's ability to serve future clients and
could affect counsel's future client development potential and, thus, prosperity. In addition,
depending upon the degree of concealment of client culpability, the DOJ may refer counsel to the
relevant bar for licensing sanctions, or even prosecute counsel for obstruction of justice,
conspiracy, or complicity.
Although both relators' counsel and defense counsel will suffer some of the same consequences
if the DOJ discovers that they have concealed their clients' culpability, their damage is not
identical. For example, relators' counsel will suffer an additional consequence of deceit with the
DOJ that defense counsel will not. Recall that the FCA provides that defendants must pay
"reasonable" attorneys' fees to plaintiffs. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). When the DOJ trusts the relator's
counsel and is willing to work hand-in-hand with the relator's counsel on FCA cases, or even to
delegate the bulk of work on FCA cases to the relator's counsel, the relator's counsel is able to
generate fees on such work. If the DOJ declines to deal with the relator's counsel or strives to
keep interactions with the relator's counsel to a bare minimum, the relator's counsel's ability to
perform fee-generating work on FCA cases will be diminished.
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d. Information Exchange Within the FCA Bar
Members of a close-knit group contribute to the circulation of
information about issues important to each other. 139 In the context of
the FCA, such information includes court rulings, DOJ policies,
interpretations of these rulings and policies, and informal developments
such as the custom, practice, and personalities of players. 140 This
communication may be through formal publications or casual
conversation among the players. For example, an off-hand remark by a
defense attorney to a relator's attorney, as in, "I wish you had filed that
in the Fourth Circuit," communicates that the Fourth Circuit follows
precedent on an issue pertinent to the case that favors the defense. One
relator's attorney's comment to another relator's attorney, "That office
is full of idiots," or "That's a great office to work with. See if you can
get venue there," communicates volumes about which U.S. Attorney's
office is more favorable to relators.
e. Power Within the FCA Bar
1. Power Held by the DOJ
The power held by DOJ attorneys is obvious. These attorneys decide
whether the federal government will intervene in a relator's case,
whether to work with the relator, the manner in which the DOJ will
cooperate with the relator, whether and how to oppose the relator in the
case, and what percentage of the recovery they will recommend for
relator. 141
2. Power Held by Relators' Counsel
Power is held by relators' counsel in five ways. First, and most
obviously, relators' counsel can influence potential relators on whether
to become relators in the first place, and where to file a relator's
complaint. Given the risks to potential relators of becoming
whistleblowers, 142 willingness to become a qui tam relator may exist
only after considerable education of a potential relator by counsel.
Also, as noted above, relators' counsel determine in which district a
139. See ELLICKSON, supra note 38, at 57 (referring to "truthful negative gossip" as a way of
communicating deviance by neighbors to other neighbors).
140. Such information exchange also occurs at professional meetings such as the American
Bar Association's National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act.
141. See, e.g. United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420,
429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1998), rev'd, 205 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Alderson v.
Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1325-35 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
142. See Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 8, at 948-58.
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relator should file a qui tam action (and thus, with which U.S.
Attorney's office a relator will be working).143
Second, relators' counsel can screen out nonmeritorious relators,
which, given the expansive reach of the FCA and regulatory complexity
of the contracting world covered by the FCA, takes considerable
sophistication on the part of counsel. 144 Such screening saves the DOJ
time and resources.
Third, relators' counsel, working together with a relator, can educate
the DOJ about new and evolving frauds of which the DOJ has no
knowledge. It can take considerable time, effort, and expertise on the
part of relators' counsel to sift through a relator's information and
present a coherent explanation of complex transactions to the DOJ.
With the benefit of conversations protected by the attorney-client
privilege, an experienced relator's attorney can piece together the fraud
the relator has uncovered.
Fourth, relators' counsel can supplement the DOJ's resources
significantly by assisting in, and even absorbing, a major portion of the
work load of investigating and preparing an FCA case. 145
Fifth, as a co-plaintiff, a relator has statutory power under the FCA.
For example, a relator may oppose the DOJ's requests for extensions of
time, which the DOJ may seek when deciding whether to intervene; 146
the relator may oppose the DOJ's motion to unseal or partially unseal a
relator's complaint so as to discuss and negotiate with the putative
defendant; 147 and the relator may oppose the DOJ's efforts to settle or
dismiss the action. 148  The extent to which a relator exercises her
statutory power over a case can facilitate or frustrate the DOJ's chosen
strategies.149
143. Kreindler, supra note 75, at 7 (discussing how approaches to qui tam cases vary greatly
from one U.S. Attorney's office to another).
144. See Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 7, at 55, 68-69.
145. Bucy, Games and Stories, supra note 6, at 670.
146. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)-(3) (2000).
147. WEST, supra note 61, at 26.
148. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B).
149. For example, a relator can oppose the government's request for an extension of the
sealing period, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), the government's effort to dismiss the action, id. at
§3730(c)(2)(A), or settle the action, id. § 3730(c)(2)(B). Opposing the DOJ may result in a lesser
percentage of the recovery for relators at the conclusion of the case, since the DOJ might argue to
the court that the relator was not cooperative. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Coughlin v. IBM
Corp., 992 F. Supp. 137, 142 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). In Coughlin, the DOJ opposed the relators'
request for a 25% share of the settlement in a qui tam action in part because the relators opposed
the settlement reached by the DOJ and the defendant. Id. The court agreed with the DOJ and
awarded the realtor 15% of the settlement, noting, among other things, that "[rielators vigorously
opposed the settlement of this matter." Id.
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3. Power Held by FCA Defense Counsel
The FCA defense counsel holds power within the group because of
its ability to evaluate the information collected both by the DOJ and by
relators, and because it informs and influences its clients. Defense
counsel's influence may well begin early in FCA cases. For example,
the DOJ often obtains the unsealing of a relator's complaint before it
officially joins as a party. 150 This gives the defendant an opportunity to
review and respond to allegations and evidence before the DOJ decides
whether to intervene. 15 1 If a defense attorney finds from this review
that the defendant may have liability, the defense attorney can be of
immense help to the DOJ and the relator by educating her client about
the seriousness of the matter. Accustomed to general civil litigation,
clients may expect to engage in delay strategies, which generally work
to the defense's favor. Delaying an FCA case, however, can be
catastrophic. 152 Helping a client see a quick resolution of liability,
especially before the DOJ joins the case as a plaintiff, can significantly
reduce penalties and damages under the Act. 153
f. Sanctions Employed by the FCA Bar for Breaches of
Informal Norms
The FCA bar employs sanctions to enforce its norms that are similar
to the sanctions Ellickson found were being used by the residents of
Shasta County. In both groups, these sanctions include informing the
offender, truthful negative gossip about the offender within the
community, cessation of cooperation, and referring the offender to
enforcers. 154
1. Inform the Offender and Allow an Opportunity to Correct
Informing the offender and allowing an opportunity for correction is
a minimal sanction appropriate for minor breaches of informal norms.
Within FCA practice, minor breaches include actions such as not
showing up for a scheduled meeting or failing to produce information or
services when promised.
150. See WEST, supra note 61, at 26.
151. Id.
152. Penalties accrue as additional false claims are filed, thus, delay can increase the penalties.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
153. John R. Phillips, Remarks at the A.B.A. National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act
and Qui Tam Enforcement, Panel on FCA Enforcement in the Post-Stevens World (Nov. 2000).
154. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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2. Truthful Negative Gossip
Truthful negative gossip, which is repeating to others within the
community facts of a violator's breach of a norm, is appropriate for
repeated, minor breaches of norms, and for slightly more serious
breaches. In the FCA context, this would include actions such as
carelessly (though not intentionally) providing incorrect or incomplete
information about the case or counsel. Given the importance of
reputation in the success of one's FCA practice, this is a particularly
meaningful sanction.
3. Cease Cooperation
Cessation of cooperation is appropriate for serious breaches of
conduct. In the FCA context, this would include actions such as
repeated presentations of incomplete or inaccurate information and
dishonoring a significant commitment. 155 Different players within the
FCA bar have varying abilities to exercise this option. DOJ attorneys
have the most discretion to invoke this sanction since the DOJ simply
can cease cooperating with a relator and fall back on its traditional
investigative techniques if it decides not to work with the relator. If a
relator has already provided helpful information to the DOJ and the
DOJ ceases to cooperate with the relator, the DOJ would lose little in
exercising this sanction. The relator and relator's counsel, however,
would lose a lot, as the DOJ's disassociation of a relator prevents the
relator from assisting in the case and would result in a lower percentage
of any recovery for the relator. Notably, relator's counsel also would
lose if the DOJ ceases cooperation with the relator, because most
relators' counsel negotiate with their clients for a share of the relator's
percentage in addition to the statutorily awarded attorneys fees. 156
Disassociation of a relator and the relator's counsel from active
participation in the case also obviously reduces the opportunity to
perform additional hourly work, thereby reducing the attorneys' fees
allowable under the FCA and payable to the relator's counsel by
defendant.
155. For example, cessation of cooperation could affect the DOJ's commitment not to move
for dismissal, defense counsel's commitment that he is disclosing the full extent of the
defendant's fraud, or the relator's counsel's commitment that the relator will agree to a DOJ
settlement of a case.
156. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032,
1036 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing contingency fees relators' attorneys negotiate with their clients
in addition to court-ordered attorneys fees and costs); BOESE, supra note 15, § 4.09[A][1]
(discussing awards of attorneys fees under the FCA).
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Realistically, the only way relators and relators' counsel can exercise
a cessation of cooperation sanction is by taking the relator's case to
another U.S. Attorney's office. It is harmful to a relator and her counsel
to cease cooperating with the DOJ once the case has begun because
doing so will reduce the percentage of any recovery awarded to the
relator in the case. To the extent that the relator's information is helpful
in investigating the case, which presumably it is or the DOJ would not
be willing to work with the relator, the relator's cessation of cooperation
could jeopardize the success of the case.
Defendants and their counsel have the least ability to exercise a
disassociation option. A decision to cease cooperating with the DOJ
(and/or the relator, depending on whether the DOJ has intervened in the
case) simply because the DOJ or the relator has breached norms of
behavior is short-sighted for a defendant. Cessation of cooperation by a
defendant will simply cause more penalties and damages to accrue.
Significant noncooperation even could be viewed as a criminal matter,
such as obstruction of justice. 157
4. Refer the Offender to Enforcers
Referring offenders to "enforcers" is the most serious sanction.
Enforcers in the context of FCA practice include disciplinary
committees of the relevant bar and criminal prosecutors. The sanction
of referral to criminal prosecutors could be exercised by any player
against any other player. The most draconian deployment of this
sanction would be referral of a player, or witness, to the DOJ Criminal
Division or another group that has authority to bring criminal charges
(such as a State's Attorney General's office). Presumably, exercise of
this sanction would be used when the breach of norms is severe, such as
destruction of subpoenaed records, submission of fraudulent records, or
providing false testimony under oath. 15
8
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has applied game theory principles identified by Robert
Axelrod and Robert Ellickson concerning optimal strategies for players
of close-knit groups involved in iterated games to the regulatory game
157. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1504-1505, 1518 (2000); id. §§ 1512, 1516 (2000 & West Supp.
2003).
158. Such conduct may constitute obstruction of justice, see, e.g., id § 1512 (2000 & West
Supp. 2003), or, depending upon the specifics, a violation of dozens of criminal fraud offenses.
See, e.g., id. § 1341 (providing the penalties for mail fraud); id. § 1343 (prescribing the penalties
for wire fraud); id. § 1961(1) (defining racketeering), amended by Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 5(b), 117 Stat. 2875.
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created by the civil FCA. Axelrod's principles for iterated games
suggest that to optimize success under the FCA, the DOJ should
cooperate with relators who bring information of wrongdoing to the
DOJ's attention. If relators or their counsel behave irresponsibly, such
as by providing inaccurate information or frustrating the investigation,
the DOJ should cease cooperating with the relator and should return to
cooperation only if the relator's defection has not damaged the case, and
the relator and her counsel return to cooperation. This is the Tit-for-Tat
strategy that Axelrod found to be most effective in iterated games. To
facilitate cooperation, the DOJ should embrace the press and the private
FCA bar in communicating the specifics of its Tit-for-Tat strategy.
The FCA bar is a close-knit group, as defined by Robert Ellickson in
his studies of game theory. A close-knit group is identified by
interactions among repeat players who share common characteristics
and informal norms and exchange information easily, where each player
possesses power within the group and the group employs sanctions to
discipline members who fail to follow the group's informal norms.
Those involved in FCA practice share common characteristics: 93.5%
of the FCA private bar share at least two significant professional
characteristics. 159 There are informal norms within the FCA bar that
govern the interactions among members and the sanctions for violation
of these norms.
Because of the FCA's success in dealing with complex economic
wrongdoing and our global economy's need for effective tools to
combat such wrongdoing, expansion of the FCA's model should be
considered by policy makers. 160 Implementing this Act, whether in an
expanded form or in its current form, however, should be informed by
an appreciation of how to optimize its effectiveness. This Article has
attempted to use game theory principles to highlight some of the ways
to use the FCA effectively.
159. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
160. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 7, at 76-80.
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